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Book Reviews

Katherine C. Epstein, Torpedo. Inventing the Military-Industrial
Complex in the United States and Great Britain (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2014). Pp. 305.
When American Civil War Admiral David Farragut famously
ordered his warships to “Damn the torpedoes” and proceed full
speed ahead at the Battle of Mobile Bay, he was using naval parlance
that had long referred to floating underwater mines. Two years later,
in 1866, Englishman Robert Whitehead appropriated that term for
his new invention, the self-propelled torpedo, a weapon which would
revolutionize naval warfare. In her painstakingly researched and
immensely detailed book Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial
Complex in the United States and Great Britain, Katherine Epstein
delivers a fascinating and multidisciplinary overview of how the
torpedo evolved and was adopted into the United States Navy (usn )
and Royal Navy (rn ) from the late nineteenth century up to start of
the First World War.1 Epstein’s claim is that the torpedo’s origin
story was a preview of how public-private industrial relationships
involving sophisticated weapons systems would subsequently be
structured.
The book is divided into six chapters, with an introduction and
a conclusion. The chapters examine the comparative interactions of
agencies of the usn and rn with torpedo manufacturers (sometimes
the same companies operating in both countries) as they struggled
to come to terms with a new technology that had the potential to
outrange the gunnery of their battleships. The goal of the two navies
was the same—to gain and maintain advantage over their naval
competitors—but they had different approaches, and experienced
different outcomes. The rn , the world’s preeminent naval power,
possessed a superior research & development (r & d) infrastructure
and was confident enough in its naval prowess to deploy torpedo
technology through an incremental, cautious, and thoughtful process

1   The number of scholars working on this subject could probably fit comfortably
inside a torpedo tube. As Epstein’s book is not a history of the torpedo per se,
readers seeking to know more should see Roger Branfill-Cook, Torpedo. The
Complete History of the World’s Most Revolutionary Naval Weapon (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2014), Thomas Wildenberg and Norman Polmar, Ship Killer:
A History of the American Torpedo (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), and
Edwyn Gray, The Devil’s Device: Robert Whitehead and the History of the Torpedo,
rev. ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 10
c a n a d i a n m i l i ta ry h i s t o ry

29

(though Epstein notes this approach should not to be deemed
conservative), while at the same time carefully considering the
torpedo’s impact on naval tactics and strategy. In contrast, the usn ,
an upstart naval power, lacked such r & d infrastructure, and instead
chose to gamble on radical (and riskier) technological breakthroughs
hoping for a shortcut to advantage; the usn also was less focused on
discussions of tactics and strategy. The result was a process that paid
off for the rn in terms of cost-effectiveness, performance, and naval
doctrine (though it was not without its problems), but one which can
only be described as trouble prone for the usn .
Epstein anchors her book around a concept developed in William
McNeill’s classic, The Pursuit of Power—“command technology.”2
Essentially, the torpedo was among the first weapons systems that
were so complex that the private sector could no longer solely afford
the r & d costs associated with them. As a result, militaries could no
longer expect to purchase off-the-shelf armaments from companies
that assumed the entire r & d risk; they would have to directly finance
cutting edge design while also sharing the expertise of technically
skilled military personnel with these companies. Of course, by entering
into such commercial partnerships, militaries could now directly
influence the design of these advanced weapons. But, as Epstein
writes, command technology carried unexpected consequences:
First, command technology put a premium on the development of a kind
of technology – which I call servant technology – that could generate
information to improve command technology. Second, the information
generated by servant technology was itself a commodity because it had
the power to affect market relationships by offering insight into the
value of command technology. This commodified information was a
distinctive kind of property. Third, the collaboration between the public
and private sectors required to develop command technology raised
fundamental and complex questions about the nature of property in
relation to invention. When more than one party helped to invent a
piece of technology, how could ownership of the intellectual property
rights be established? (p. 15)

2
   William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and
Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 278-279.
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Essentially, the line where private ended and public began became
blurred. The implications of this are outlined in one of the more
intriguing explications in Epstein’s work, where torpedo r & d
intersected with intellectual property rights and patent law (as well
as national security law). Poor management of the relationship and
the contracts between the usn , their own engineers, and their torpedo
manufacturers resulted in two high profile patent infringement cases,
both of which went all the way to the us Supreme Court. Both
cases ended in favour of the us government, despite the weakness
of the government cases. Epstein does an excellent job guiding the
reader through an admittedly arcane subject, both on the technical
aspects of the ownership of the torpedo patents, the ins and outs
of the contracts and the legal environment, and the implications
for future state-society relations. This situation, it should be noted,
proved to be far more problematic in the us than in Britain, where
patents could be deemed secret and where skilled rn personnel could
be rewarded (both monetarily and through promotion) for their
innovations, thereby avoiding their departure for more lucrative
careers with defence contractors.
In President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 17 January 1961 farewell
speech, he advised the United States to guard against the “unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, of the military-industrial
complex [mic ]” (p. 1)—an iron triangle of mutually supporting and
beneficial relationships between the defence industrial base, the armed
forces and government, and academia that could distort peacetime
public policy choices.3 Ever since, the mic has been conceptualized in
terms of the post-Second World War period, and Epstein’s book does
a great service by continuing to trace the historiography of the mic
to the nineteenth century.
But are the Bliss Company and the usn ’s Torpedo Station,
and the Whitehead Company and the rn ’s Torpedo Factory really
the progenitors of General Dynamics and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency? Certainly some key aspects of the mic
are present, but just as many are missing in these formative years:

3
   On the speech see James Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D.
Eisenhower and the military-industrial complex (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2011). A comprehensive overview of the concept of the MIC can be gained from
The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society, ed. Sterling Michael Pavlec
(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010).
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the companies were sometimes reluctant, if not outright hostile,
partners with the military (and vice-versa), as opposed to being in
a symbiotic relationship; big research in the form of military-funded
university research laboratories was nascent; legislators in Congress
and Parliament were mostly looking to cut defence budgets, not
expand them. One is left with the impression they are meant to draw
their own logical conclusions about the emergence of the mic at the
end of this book, but it is easy to lose one’s way regarding Epstein’s
thesis amidst the immense historical and technical detail presented
about the torpedo itself. A work of such original scholarship would
have benefitted from a more convincing conclusion, but this does not
diminish the overall value of the book.
In summary, this book is a great read and it is highly
recommended. Epstein combines a refreshingly original approach
with an interesting topic on which she skillfully brings to bear many
disciplinary perspectives. By the end of the book the reader not
only has an in-depth knowledge of the early history of the torpedo
in the us and Britain, but also a thorough understanding of the
administration and comparative tactics and strategy of both a weak
naval power aspiring to become strong and a strong naval power
determined to stay that way in the face of a game changing weapons
system, of nineteenth century business history and the origins of the
legal system’s intellectual property and patent law protection, and
of the theoretical and evolutionary underpinnings of the mic . As an
added bonus, given the volume of clearly and carefully explained
technical and scientific detail in the book, supported by contemporary
blueprints, one could also likely build their own torpedo.4
russell isinger, university of saskatchewan

4
   An informative roundtable discussion of Epstein’s book is available online, in
which the author also participated. See Jon Sumida, Jeffrey A. Engel, Keith Neilson,
Timothy S. Wolters, and Katherine C. Epstein, review of Torpedo: Inventing the
Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain by Katherine
C. Epstein, H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews XVI, no. 14 (2015), http://www.tiny.cc/
Roundtable-XVI-14.
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